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Philosophy of Perception in Hegel
John Shannon Hendrix
According to Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel in the Introductory Lectures
on Aesthetics (The Introduction to Hegel’s Philosophy of Fine Art, 1886),
beauty in art is a higher beauty than that of nature, because beauty in art is a
product of the mind, or spirit, the intellectual rather than the sensory. In the
Symposium of Plato, when the initiate learns to love all beautiful bodies rather than just one body, to “pursue the beauty of form” (210) 1 rather than the
beauty of the body, to turn away from the “low and small-minded slavery” of
love for the beauty of a body, and turn “towards the great sea of beauty and
gazing on it he’ll give birth, through a boundless love of knowledge, to many
beautiful and magnificent discourses and ideas,” the initiate ascends to the
beauty of mind which is higher than the beauty of nature and which can be
represented in art, discourses and ideas. Thus for Hegel in the Introductory
Lectures on Aesthetics, the beauty of art is “born—born again, that is—of the
mind….” 2
In the Symposium, the beauty of mind is to be found in the goodness of
mind, the good, so real beauty will be found in goodness, “practices and
laws,” in comparison to the beauty of the body, the beauty of nature. In that
goodness, practices and laws, the activities of reason, are subjects of
knowledge, or forms of knowledge, it is forms of knowledge which become
the higher beauty. In the Introductory Lectures on Aesthetics, “mind, and
mind only, is capable of truth, and comprehends in itself all that is, so that
whatever is beautiful can only be really and truly beautiful as partaking in
this higher element and as created thereby” (§III). Following Kant, all reality
is given by mind, but ultimately for Hegel, it is in the interaction between
mind and the sensory world given by perception, which is a product of mind,
reconciling the gap between the Platonic idea and the sensible world, or the
idea of beauty as it is applied to the objects of perception. Mind “comprehends in itself all that is,” so that sensible beauty can exist in the real, what is
perceived, but it is a product of the ideal, of mind. The beauty of nature thus
“reveals itself as but a reflection of the beauty which belongs to the mind, as
an imperfect, incomplete mode of being….” Beauty in nature is a product of
mind inserting itself into the sensible world, of coming to terms with what
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mind perceives as being alien to it, as Hegel explains at length in the Phenomenology of Spirit.
In the Timaeus of Plato, the reflections of sensible appearance are caused
by the interaction of the interior and the exterior in perception, between the
intellectual and the sensible, described by Plato as internal and external fires.
According to Plato, “And the principles governing reflections in mirrors and
other smooth reflecting surfaces are not that difficult to understand. All such
appearances are necessary consequences of the combination of the internal
and external fire, which form a unity at the reflecting surface, though distorted in various ways, the fire of the face seen coalescing with that of the eye on
the smooth reflecting surface” (Timaeus 46). 3 The interaction of the internal
and external fires results in sensible appearances, composed of distortions,
reflections and shadows, momentary manifestations in the flux of being. Images in the sensory world do not exist without being perceived; they are the
products of mind, their qualities are given by mind, and they are understood
by reason in mind. Sensory appearances as we understand them are selfreflections of mind, which is why an understanding of perception is necessary for an understanding of the operations of intellect.
The sensory world for Hegel must be seen as an imperfect and incomplete mode of being, as it is given by mind, but not all of mind. That aspect
of mind which tells itself that the sensory world is a reflection of mind, that
is, self-consciousness, is not present in the sensory world. The selfconsciousness of mind reveals the presence of mind in perception; both mind
and sensory appearance thus participate in the absolute, which is the unity of
mind and perception, of the ideal and real. The self-consciousness of mind
reveals the necessity of the absolute in existence, of the grounds of the relation between the perceiving mind and what is perceived. The absolute is present in what is perceived, but it is not revealed by perception, perception
being a function of reason and language, a dissemination of the absolute in
logic which thus cannot participate in the absolute, as in the relation between
the One of Plotinus and both intellect and sensory appearance.
Perception constructs the real as a product of the ideal, as containing the
same essence, but in so doing establishes the incompatibility of the real and
ideal. “Nature is not thus to be set over against absolute Mind, either as conjoint with a sphere of the Real of equal worth, or as an independent boundary
thereto. Rather the aspect which Nature appears to hold in this respect is that
which mind or spirit itself sets up, and of which it becomes the product as a
Nature in which limit and boundary are themselves determining constituents.
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In fact, Mind in its absolute or infinite substance can only be apprehended as
this free activity, which is manifested in self-development through differentiation” (Introduction to The Philosophy of Fine Art [Introductory Lectures on
Aesthetics], pp. 126–127), 4 differentiation from the absolute, manifestation
of intelligence in the real. Differentiation, the setting of oppositions, is in fact
the activity by which the ideal enters into the real in perception, thus it must
be differentiation in the ideal which leads the real in the ideal to the absolute.
Nature, the real, what is perceived, is the “Idea in apparent shape, which
mind, in its synthetic power, posits as the object opposed to itself,” as described by Hegel (p. 127). What is perceived is thus “the determination by
mind of its own substance, its ideality and power of determination, through a
process which no doubt begins with a separation of itself into two factors
which apparently negate each other, but which, by the very activity of such
negation and separation, passes beyond the contradiction it implies to a unity
which heals the fracture.” The dialectical synthesis of the differentiation in
the absolute in the ideal constitutes the subjectivity of mind, the subjective.
In subjective mind, the real is not “explicitly unfolded,” as it is in perception,
and complete self-consciousness. The real becomes the other to subjective
mind in its state of explication, but an other that is defined by finitude rather
than the infinity of the absolute. Mind must project itself into its other in order to recover the infinity of the absolute in the subjective. Mind cannot recover its subjectivity in the real through logic or discursive reason, through
that which established its finitude in the real. This can only be accomplished
in the intellectual in philosophy.
In perception, mind always has a sense that what is being given of the real in perception is not being in its completion; the limitations of reason are
self-apparent in self-consciousness as well. The nature of the human mind is
to seek completion in being, whether it be reconciliation of the primordial
dehiscence, or recognition of the presence of the absolute in the ideal. Ordinary consciousness is the “entirely finite, temporal, contradictory, and for
that reason transitory, unsatisfied, and un-reconciled spirit” (p. 128). In such
a consciousness, the satisfactions of reason can only have a “purely relative
and isolated validity,” a condition which thought must necessarily seek to
surpass. Appearance as given by perception is seen as a finite function of
reason, and in the perception of the real, the intersection of mind and what is
external to it, “mind grasps its finiteness as the negation of its own essential
substance, and is aware of its infinity.” In this activity mind is subjective because it is self-determinate and the object of its own will. In this activity
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mind enacts the principle of differentiation which is the essence of the absolute; reasoning mind doubles itself in relation to the absolute, where the
knower and the known are undifferentiated. In this way the infinite is injected into the finite, the ideal into the real, as the real is participant in reason. In
absolute mind, the intellectual of Plotinus, principle and activity are the
same, ideal and real. In the ideal, the real is participant in the absolute.
In the Phaedrus (249) of Plato, reason gathers the “multiplicity of senseimpressions” and creates from them universals.5 In order to do this, it must
recollect its perception of sense impressions as archetypes, a kind of perception to which it was initiated, in the intersection of mind and appearance,
ideal and real. Philosophy is the application of the remembrance of archetypal images in perception, the a priori synthesis of the real and ideal applied to
the real, in the intersection of mind and appearance as given by perception. If
the soul of the philosopher dwells in the memory of the archetypal images, in
the presence of the absolute in mind, then it will experience a “continual initiation into the perfect mystic vision.” The philosopher in the Phaedrus thus
appears to ordinary consciousness to be “out of his wits,” to be possessed by
a god. “This then is the fourth type of madness, which befalls when a man,
reminded by the sight of beauty on earth of the true beauty,” as in the Symposium, “grows his wings and endeavors to fly upward, but in vain, exposing
himself to the reproach of insanity because like a bird he fixes his gaze on
the heights to the neglect of things below,” but beholds his true being.
The Phenomenology of Spirit, first published in 1807, is an attempt to establish the manifestation of the absolute in the experience of the real. The
Philosophy of Spirit seeks to define the individual subject in relation to the
universal culture; it sees the individual as a microcosm of its culture, in the
same way that in classical philosophy the individual was seen as a microcosm of the structure of the universe. It is in the self-consciousness of mind,
or spirit, that the absolute is most completely manifested, in the independent
activity of mind, the products of which are philosophy and art. The selfconsciousness of mind contains the ideas of the universal as archetypes for
reason and perception, in the same way as the intellectual of Plotinus, which
is participated in by the absolute, and which dictates forms to discursive reason. Self-consciousness allows mind to translate sense experience in perception into idea, as manifestation of the absolute. Perception alone, without the
participation of self-consciousness, can only present a limited picture of the
real to mind, a picture determined by appearances and inchoate forms. The
understanding in self-consciousness makes perceptible an underlying struc-
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ture of signification in relation to perceived forms and appearances, which
allows the experience of the real in perception to be integrated with mind to
form an experience which synthesizes the real and the ideal, the objective
and subjective, and the individual thinking subject and universal principles as
manifestations of the absolute.
Mind or spirit comes to be seen as reality, the inner being of the world
which assumes objective, determinate form, and enters into relations with itself as externality. It doubles itself in its otherness, but retains its inner essence within itself, self-contained and self-complete, which is inaccessible to
its manifestations in the particular. Mind is implicit in its nature as selfcontained (an sich); it does not exist in the real, and does not exhibit the
qualities of the real, of differentiation in the particular, until the initial doubling of itself as otherness or externality, through perception. Mind becomes
object, but as object mind is immediately negated. Mind becomes selfreflected in the object which is the product of its doubling, which is discursive reason. Discursive reason is the objective self-reflection of mind, resulting from a self-alienation of mind in the perceived world. Mind, the
intellectual, is negated in reason, but is reflected by reason, so that reason
can perceive it.
When the object in the sensible world is perceived, it comes into being,
because the unfolding of the universal from the particular is enacted in relation to mind. The object is perceived as containing both the particular and
universal, and its coming into being is its process of differentiation of the
universal from the particular, the process of reason toward understanding,
which mind perceives in itself in self-consciousness, which is enacted in perception in relation to the object perceived. The object perceived becomes an
element and a catalyst of the dialectical process of mind toward understanding. The act of perceiving is the act of mind in reason toward understanding.
In the Phenomenology of Spirit, “the way we take in perception is no longer
something that just happens to us like sense-certainty; on the contrary, it is
logically necessitated. With the emergence of the principle, the two moments
which in their appearing merely occur, also come into being: one being the
movement of pointing-out or the act of perceiving, the other being the same
movement as a simple event or the object perceived. In essence the object is
the same as the movement: the movement is the unfolding and differentiation
of the two moments, and the object is the apprehended togetherness of the
moments” (§111). 6 The universal is immediately present in the object which
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is perceived, because the object cannot be defined as other than being perceived, and thus contains within it the process of perception.
The principle of the universal is the essence of perception. The perceiving subject, and the object which is perceived, are both unessential in relation
to the process of perception as particulars, but both contain the principle of
the universal within them, and in combination as opposites, constitute the
universal principle of perception. The coincidence of opposites is always already present in the universal, as the self-differentiation of the absolute. The
act of perception creates the unessential character of both the perceiver and
the object perceived in the process of differentiation which must then be reconciled in understanding toward which reason in perception progresses. The
variable properties of an object of perception are the exhibition of the universal within the particular as enacted by perception. The properties of an object
are constructed by perception, as products of the progression of reason toward understanding, toward the absolute. Though it is a screen which masks
the essential nature of the absolute in the real, as in the Republic of Plato, the
flux of appearance is the necessary context of the real in perception, in interaction with the ideal, toward the revelation of the absolute.
In perception as the self-consciousness of reason, the object of perception
is transformed from the particular which embodies the absence of being into
a participant in the principle of the universal which reveals the absolute. Perception negates the existence of the object as a particular, and in the process
allows the object to come into being in the universal. Being, as the principle
of the universal, contains the negation within it; being is not possible without
non-being, as perception is not possible without the object perceived. The
negation of being is contained in the differentiation of the object of perception, in the multiple permutations given to the object by perception. Coming
to being contains the negation of being as well. The multiple permutations of
the object are independent of each other as particulars, and are related to
each other through the principle of the universal, which is independent of
them. The multiple particulars of the flux of appearance only participate in
the universal through reason; in the suspension of reason, the multiple particulars—shadows, reflections, refractions, trajectories, etc. (the qualities of
objects in perception)—appear as self-determinate entities, embodying the
universal within themselves, independent of the process of reason. The
ground of non-being appears as being, in the complete self-alienation of reason from being. The differentiation between reason and being, as given by
reason in being, is that which is overcome in the process of perception.
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In conscious perception the object of perception is developed in reason,
in particular the contradictions contained within the object as it is perceived.
The object is perceived as both a particular and a universal; as a universal the
object participates in being, in coming into being; as a particular the object is
non-being. The object perceived as non-being is also the object perceived as
being; being simultaneously co-exists with being in perception, reason with
non-reason. Non-being is also the essence of the absolute. The particular as
non-being which excludes itself from the community of being in reason contains the same essence which is revealed through reason in understanding, as
a product of perception. It is in this way that reason participates in being, and
consciousness in perception, which “has a mediated relation to the inner being and, as the Understanding, looks through this mediating play of Forces
into the true background of things” (Phenomenology of Spirit §143). That
which unites understanding and the essence of being is appearance in perception, which, as understanding and being come together, is “henceforth only a
vanishing.”
Appearance is in its own self a non-being and a surface show, as in the
Republic, a non-essential medium of understanding in perception. As a surface show, appearance displays the principle of the universal, a totality in relation to particulars, which is contained in the particulars. In appearance, as
given by perception, the particular immediately becomes its own opposite, as
the particular is transformed into the universal by reason, thus appearance in
perception is unstable and ephemeral. The negative dialectic of appearance
becomes a positive in the understanding of the principle of the universal. The
being of the object is “mediated by the movement of appearance” (§143) in
consciousness and becomes the negation of being as a particular. Consciousness sees itself, its own processes, in the negative dialectic of appearance.
The negation of being becomes being in reason as self-differentiation; it is
activated in the dialectical becoming of being, as the particular is transformed into the universal. The “objective vanishing appearance” given by
perception becomes the being-for-self of consciousness in the negative dialectic. The self-differentiation of the absolute, and the self-alienation of reason from being, becomes the being of reason in relation to the absolute.
Reason, in its self-differentiation, is a product of the synthesis of the universal and the particular beyond the particular. The negation of being confirms being beyond appearance and the sensible world, beyond the
mechanisms of perception and of reason itself, which is a function of nonreason in the same way. The essence of being is found in the supersensible,
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as in the idea of Plato and the intelligible of Plotinus, that which exceeds the
dialectic of being and non-being in perception, reason and non-reason in
mind, the double negative of the identity of the ideal and the real. Appearance in perception is an element in reason in the dialectic between being and
the absolute, and in syllogistic reasoning between the absolute and being, as
it is embodied in the particular; “above the vanishing present world there
opens up a permanent beyond” (§144) in the absolute. The beyond is the inner world in relation to consciousness, where consciousness is unable to find
itself. It is the empty nothingness of being in appearance, the self-alienation
of reason as manifest in perception, and the simple and unitary universal
which is inaccessible to the particulars of perception and logic.
The world of appearance is the essence of the supersensible beyond in
the sense that it is through appearance that the absolute comes into being,
though appearance at the same time negates the being of the absolute. The
world of appearance is the sensible world posited by reason as having been
superseded by the universal in perception; appearance itself is the mediation
between the real and the ideal in perception, thus appearance is the essence
of the absolute in relation to the real, to the sensible world, given that there is
a sensible world beyond appearance or perception. There must be a sensible
world beyond appearance in order that reason be self-determinant, and that
consciousness become self-consciousness in the understanding of an absolute. “The supersensible is therefore appearance qua appearance” (§147);
proof of the supersensible, thus the sensible, is given by appearance, by the
double negative of appearance in being, by reason itself, and in particular the
limitations of discursive reason.
The double negative of appearance in itself has no significance; it is empty as shadow and reflection. It is only as mediator of being and understanding that appearance in perception, as construct of reason, assumes
significance. Appearance is the meeting of being and understanding, through
the self-determination of being. The “play of forces” (§148) in appearance
enacts an interplay or interchange “of the determinateness which constitutes
the sole content of what appears: to be either a universal medium, or a negative unity.” The content of appearance is the dialectic of being and understanding, of nothingness and the absolute, in the particular and the universal.
The interplay constitutes a transformation of the particular to the universal,
of the dark ground of being to the ineffable absolute, carried out by the particulars of reason and perception. In the process of being becoming understanding, it is negated in its being by reason and is absorbed into the
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principle of the universal, by which being is given to understanding. The essence of being is self-differentiated, and what is left in understanding of being is only the self-differentiation of being. The principle of the universal in
understanding is an “absolute flux” which “is only difference as a universal
difference, or as a difference into which the many antitheses have been resolved.”
The understanding is the différance of Deconstruction, the “systematic
play of differences,” 7 as described by Jacques Derrida in Positions, a “generative movement in the play of differences” in appearance, a negation of being in understanding which has only a deferred presence in reason. The play
of differences in appearance is a “spacing” in reason, which “designates
nothing, nothing that is, no presence at a distance; it is the index of an irreducible exterior, and at the same time of a movement, a displacement that indicates an irreducible alterity” (p. 81), the movement of the play of
differences in perception, the double negation of being in perception, and the
self-alienation of reason in being. For Hegel, in the principle of the universal
the flux of differences becomes absolute and simple; the universal of the essence of being is both absolute identity and absolute difference. Negation is
an essential aspect of the universal flux of difference, and is itself a universal
difference. The negation of being is an essential element in the universal flux
of differences as being. In reason, through appearance, the play of differences, the différance, is translated into universal principle.
The principle in reason which is the expression of différance is the “stable image of unstable appearance” (Phenomenology of Spirit §149) according to Hegel, the reconstruction of appearance in perception as given to
reason by reason. The only principle of appearance itself is the universal flux
of differences, as in the turbulence of the immortal souls thrust into the universal body in the Timaeus (43) of Plato, which “were unable to control it,
nor were they controlled by it, and because of the constant violent conflict
the motions of the whole creature were irregular, fortuitous and irrational.”
The supersensible world of the absolute in understanding is the law of stability in identity which corresponds to the law of instability in difference in the
sensible world as given by appearance in perception. In the Timaeus, the unstable flux of differences is the result of the binding of the soul to the body,
of understanding to perception. The regular motion of the Same in the soul is
a product of the detachment of the soul from body, when the unstable flux of
difference has been transformed into the stable law of identity in understanding. “And because of all this the soul when first bound to its mortal body is
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as much without reason today as it was in the beginning. But when the
stream of growth and nourishment flows less strongly, the soul’s orbits take
advantage of the calm and as time passes steady down in their proper courses, and the movement of the circles at last regains its correct natural form”
(44), that given by the principle of the universal in reason.
As it is subject to differentiation, the understanding is given through appearance, according to Hegel, through reason in perception. But the understanding, in self-consciousness, sees differentiation as a manifestation of
universal differentiation; as self-consciousness, the differentiation which the
understanding sees is its own. All differentiation in the real, in matter and nature, as given by appearance, is perceived by mind as it projects itself, its
own self-differentiation, into the real. Differentiation becomes universal in
understanding because it is seen as the universal and eternal presence of differentiation in itself; the idea of infinity is the identity of the ideal and the real, the perception of the real as the identity of real and ideal within the ideal.
In self-consciousness, in the inner world of mind not given to itself by perception, mind sees itself as identical to the super-sensible, that which precedes the real in perception, but it is only through the “mediating term of
appearance” (§165) that mind sees itself as prior to appearance.
The participation of reason in the understanding is predicated on the
function of discursive reason in perception; reason cannot see itself as differentiated from perception without the use of perception. Differentiation is only possible in identity, and the absolute in understanding is only possible in
the differentiation in reason. In the self-consciousness of reason in perception, “this curtain hanging before the inner world is drawn away, and we
have the inner being gazing into the inner world—the vision of the undifferentiated selfsame being, which repels itself from itself…” (§165). The curtain hanging before the inner world is the luminous embroidered veil in the
Republic, the curtain along the road next to the cave which separates the cave
from the sun, the real from the absolute; in the Republic it is “like the screen
at puppet shows between the operators and their audience, above which they
show their puppets” (514) 8. The curtain is appearance itself as given by perception, through which discursive reason is interfused in the real; when the
curtain is drawn away, the mechanisms of reason in relation to the real are
drawn away. Reason is stripped of its operative being, and is only left in selfawareness of its inoperative being, its complete alienation from its own being
in the world. The “inner being gazing into the inner world” sees the void of
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the absolute, of absolute non-being, in relation to being as given by appearance in perception.
The void of the inner world is the vision of the immortal souls in the
Phaedrus (247), which “when they reach the summit of the arch, go outside
the vault and stand upon the back of the universe; standing there they are carried around by its revolution while they contemplate what lies outside the
heavens.…a reality without color or shape, intangible but utterly real, apprehensible only by intellect which is the pilot of the soul.” Only the intellectual
can see behind the curtain of appearance constructed by reason, and see reason itself in its process of seeing, in self-consciousness. In the Enneads of
Plotinus, the vision of the immortal souls is an inner vision which is detached
from the sensual world in perception, and is given by intellection, the understanding. “Many times it has happened: lifted out of the body into myself;
becoming external to all other things and self-centered; beholding a marvelous beauty; then, more than ever, assured of community with the loftiest order; enacting the noblest life, acquiring identity with the divine; stationing
within it by having attained that activity; poised above whatsoever within the
Intellectual is less than the Supreme…” (IV.8.1). 9 Reason as it perceives itself in being differentiates itself from itself, as given to itself in consciousness, and sees itself in the illusion of seeing itself see itself, itself as given to
itself in perception, in the illusion of consciousness. The self-differentiated
illusion of seeing itself is manifest as the absence of differentiated being, as
represented by the intelligible in the absolute.
For Jacques Lacan in The Four Fundamental Concepts of PsychoAnalysis, the “I see myself seeing myself” 10 of consciousness dissociates reason to itself from perception; consciousness is the “illusion of seeing itself
seeing itself” (p. 82), which is the gaze, the double negative of reason in appearance. If reason is given by appearance, it is impossible for reason to go
behind appearance, behind the curtain into an ulterior reality. But if appearance is given by reason in consciousness for Hegel, then the revelation of being behind the curtain in the understanding is conceivable to reason. In the
Phenomenology of Spirit, “For this knowledge of what is the truth of appearance as ordinarily conceived, and of its inner being, is itself only a result of a
complex movement whereby the modes of consciousness ‘meaning’, perceiving, and the Understanding vanish…” (§165). As reason in consciousness requires the self-negation of reason, as reason cannot see itself in the
manifestation of itself in the illusion of seeing itself seeing itself, appearance
cannot be given by reason, and it is impossible for reason to enter behind the
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curtain of appearance. The essence of being is thus inaccessible to reason,
though it can be represented in the intelligible, as in the luminous embroidered veil. “Our existence,” as Georges Bataille describes it in Inner Experience, “is an exasperated attempt to complete being.” 11 Being in fact “is
‘ungraspable’—it is only grasped in error.” 12
In the Phenomenology of Spirit of Hegel, self-consciousness is desire in
that it wills itself in “superseding this other that presents itself to selfconsciousness as an independent life” (§174), establishing a certainty in selfconsciousness of itself set against the other, which in the negation of reason
in perception is nothingness. Desire is the determinate self-perpetuation of
self-consciousness around the void of its other, the dark ground of being, described by Bataille as “the dark repulsive core around which all agitation
gravitates,” 13 the place of the repulsion of reason in perception from itself.
For Hegel, desire is the objectification of self-differentiation in selfconsciousness, the self-determinate process of reason confronting its selfnegation in the ideal, which corresponds to the determinate self-perpetuation
of self-consciousness. The thinking subject, according to Jacques Lacan in
The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psycho-Analysis, projects himself into
the real and negates himself in relation to the real as given by appearance,
thus “sustaining himself in a function of desire” (p. 85). Desire is the continuous reconstitution of reason in non-reason, the continuous enactment of the
self-differentiated and self-alienated identity of reason to being in selfconsciousness in perception.
In the Phenomenology of Spirit, the differentiated particulars given by
perception in reason are an “essence-less by-play” (§687) of self-conscious
mind. “The determinations of this substance are only attributes which do not
attain to self-subsistence, but remain merely names of the many-named
One,” the absolute spirit as given by language in discursive reason. The variable forms of appearance in sense perception are adornments of reality, the
luminous embroidered veil of the real, indeterminate and insubstantial. The
proliferation of differentiated forms, vanishing shapes in the real, is the “reeling, unconstrained Life” (§688) of being-for-self. As being-for-self, the real
is the negative antithesis of the consciousness of mind, through which mind
gains self-consciousness, as being-in-itself in the other. Pure light sacrifices
itself to being-for-self in the multiplicity of forms in the real so that the absolute can participate in the particular form, as for Plotinus, and so that the particular form can see itself as being-in-itself in the other of self-consciousness.
Mind, as such, is an “artificer” for Hegel, like the Platonic Demiurge; it re-
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produces itself in the objective in consciousness prior to self-consciousness,
prior to the double negative of the realization of itself. Its presence in the objective is thus not participant in itself; its alterity to itself gives itself to selfconsciousness, as the alterity of discursive reason to itself gives itself to itself
in self-consciousness.
Self-conscious mind in discursive reason is united with the intellectual
through the subjective intelligence, or the imagination, as for Plotinus. The
intellectual “rises out of its unreality into actual existence,” from the universal to the particular, “out of a state in which it is unknowing and unconscious
into the realm of conscious Spirit” (§463). Mind is differentiated from the
appearance of being. The absolute, the unconscious real of nature, is seen as
a void in being, complete formlessness prior to the formation of the image in
the imagination. It is “the nightlike void of the supersensible beyond” (§177),
inaccessible to discursive reason. Reason becomes aware of itself in abstract
thought, given by imagination, and sees itself as other in conscious thought
and self-consciousness, in being-for-self, as noted by Eduard von Hartmann
in the Philosophy of the Unconscious of 1868 (pp. 27–8). 14 The origin of the
abstract thought of discursive reason is its being-in-self, in intuition or the
intellectual. In reason connected to sense perception, reason becomes alienated from its other, as it becomes aware of its incompatibility with the real,
with nature, and with its self-perception of its own absence in nature. Reason
then attempts to overcome its self-alienation in a dialectical struggle which
returns reason to itself, as a tropic representation in language of the reality
that it sees itself a part of.
Hegel described appearance as uniting discursive reason and the intellectual (inner being). Appearance is a stage of being between understanding in
discursive thought and essence in the intellectual. As a being-for-self, appearance is a “surface show” (Phenomenology of Spirit §143). As a surface
show, appearance is only a “vanishing.” Appearance as show or veil is the
instrument of discursive reason, in the dialectic of perception for Hegel. The
surface show as a totality is a form of universal, a product of creative imagination, a reflection of the totality of the intellectal, or the “inner into self.”
The operative force of the mediation is appearance, which is part of the
movement of the forces of being, in which the object of perception, the “sensuously objective,” is the negative of pure being, the real of nature, its other.
As this occurs in conscious thought, conscious thought is both ground and
consequence of perception. As in understanding in perception, it is both the
object of perception and the act of perception. The inner being or being-in-
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self to conscious thought is possessed in its own certainty of self, as intuition,
but the objective being, discursive reason, is outside of itself, fluctuating and
unstable, in the flux of the dialectic. The flux is the objective vanishing appearance, the twilight of things in the sensible world.
The supersensible world of the intellectual becomes the object of understanding above the sensuous world in discursive reason in perception, a permanent beyond above the vanishing present, a being-in-self. Inner being is
unknowable by sense knowledge. It is a void around which desire in perception circulates, as in the das Ding of Freud and the object a of Lacan, a being
beyond measurement and the objects of reason. In that supersensible being
comes about through appearance, as a mediating factor, appearance itself
cannot be said to be of the sensuous world (Phenomenology of Spirit §147),
as it is a representation in discursive reason of intuition or noetic thought.
Perception is not sense knowledge; it is a product of the dialectic of the particular and universal through nous pathetikos and nous poietikos, as for Plotinus. The universal in inner being is an outcome of the flux of appearance
(§149). The universal contains within itself a negation and mediation which
is the dialectical process from appearance to being-in-self, from the phenomenal to the noumenal. “This difference is expressed in the law,” according to
Hegel, “which is the stable image of unstable appearance.” The supersensible
world is “an inert realm of laws” beyond the perceived world that only exhibits laws in “incessant change” in conscious thought and perception.
The inert realm of laws “is indeed the truth for the Understanding,” but it
is not entirely manifest in appearance, but only inconsistently, given the state
of flux and particularity, as “with every change of circumstance the law has a
different actuality.” The world of appearance becomes stable in inner being,
as it becomes governed by universal and unchanging laws, concepts in intuition and intelligibles. Through appearance, discursive reason becomes unified with the supersensible world. It is able to anticipate beyond appearance,
into the ideas or principles which govern it behind the veil of forms. Beingin-self comes about when inner being sees into the inner world, and the curtain hanging before the inner world is drawn away. At this point, the dialectical processes of perception and understanding are transcended in discursive
reason, and the inner being becomes unified and identical with the inner
world in noetic thought.
It is through self-consciousness that conscious thought attains inner being
and transcends the dialectic of appearance and void, particular and universal,
toward the absolute, the real of nature. Thus, “it is in self-consciousness, in
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the Notion of Spirit, that consciousness first finds its turning point,” from
unconscious to conscious thought, “where it leaves behind it the colorful
show of the sensuous here-and-now and the nightlike void of the supersensible beyond, and steps out into the spiritual daylight of the present” (§177).
All preliminary forms of discursive reason are abstract manifestations of
mind in intuition or the intellectual, particular manifestations of the universal. Mind or the intellectual unfolds in consciousness, as each particular form
in conscious thought contains the absolute or the intellectual. The forms of
discursive reason are “only moments or vanishing quantities” (§440),
ephemeral representations, as for Plotinus. Discursive reason becomes beingin-self when it “embraces” sense-certainty, perception and understanding,
that is, when it becomes self-conscious; the absolute is the unity, or selfidentification, of conscious thought and self-consciousness. Mind is discursive reason that becomes aware of itself in self-consciousness, although it
becomes clear in the Philosophy of Mind that Hegel sees self-consciousness
as an illusion, as does Lacan.
In nature, the artificer, the unconscious real or objective, uses organic
form to communicate self-consciousness of the absolute as being-for-self.
The organic form, which is only a casing or ornament for life forms, subsumes the rectilinear flat shapes corresponding to abstract forms of thought
from perception, and “left to itself, proliferates unchecked in particularity,
being itself subjugated by the form of thought” (§694). The organic form remains in the realm of the particular, but communicating a quality of the absolute, the conflation of the particular and universal, in the symbol. The organic
form in perception is the “shape of individuality” (§695) introduced into the
aspect of the universal, the abstract form, bringing the absolute nearer to existence, making the form “more in harmony with active self-consciousness.”
In order for nature to express the inner being within the outer shape in
perception it must withdraw into its essence, its real, and shed its “living,
self-particularizing, self-entangling manifold existence” (§696) of crystalline
and organic forms. The inner being first revealed is “still simple darkness,
the unmoved, the black, formless stone,” the dialectical otherness of light
and self-consciousness. The inner being “of multiform existence is still
soundless, is not immanently differentiated and is still separated from its outer existence” (§697). The unintelligible form of inner being is the product of
the combination of nature and self-consciousness and “the darkness of
thought mating with the clarity of utterance,” the inexpressible and its form
of expression, the logos endiathetos or unuttered words of the intellectual
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and the logos prophorikos or spoken word of discursive reason. Only such a
union can express the absolute in form in perception.
The expression of mind or spirit in form is the doubling of selfconsciousness over against itself, the transcendence of matter in relation to
consciousness. The outer form retreats inward, and the inner form is selfidentical to the intuition or intelligible. The inner form is the form of selfconscious activity, thought creating itself; “the artificer has given up the synthetic effort to blend the heterogeneous forms of thought and natural objects”
(§699). The inner form is “present to its own consciousness” as consciousness itself. The form of mind is the identity of the changing and the changeless, the outer substance and inner essence of the intelligible form and
sensible form, the identity of self-consciousness and being-in-self (§748).
The form of mind in perception is the externalization of the essence of the
absolute, but it is enacted in the material forms of change, of “coming-to-be”
(§754) in discursive reason and perception. If the form of the coming-to-be is
contained within itself, as an object of discursive reason in perception, then it
is a “vanishing object” and aspires to “immediate unity with the universal
self-consciousness.” If the sensible form represents a universality and is also
composed of the certainty of discursive reason and perception, then the sensible form exists in the world “as existence raised into an ideational representation,” in the imagination. Sensible forms “constitute the periphery of
shapes which stands impatiently expectant around the birthplace of Spirit as
it becomes self-consciousness” (§754). At the center of the forms is the pure
concept of intuition, “the simplicity of the pure Notion,” in which the forms
are self-contained as intelligible forms.
The intelligible form of the Kantian categories of time and space in a priori intuition is “only the imperfect form in which the immediate mode is given a mediated or universal character,” according to Hegel; “it is merely
dipped superficially in the element of thought, is perceived in it as a sensuous mode, and not made one with the nature of thought itself. It is merely
raised into the realm of picture-thinking (Vorstellung),” as a representation,
“for this is the synthetic combination of sensuous immediacy and its universality or thought” (§764). Form in matter, sensible form, is only a derivative
or a copy of the idea of form, intelligible form. In order to participate in the
universal, or absolute, form in matter must be perceived, must become a
form of picture thinking; thus perception is the medium between the absolute
and material, perception in discursive reason.
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Noetic reason, or the intellectual, according to Hegel, “does not require,
as does finite activity, the condition of external materials”; it is only in the
image of discursive reason, in picture thinking through perception in conscious thought, that form in matter is possible, as perceived eidos. Reality
given by perception is the realization of discursive reason. Mental images are
pre-generated by the process of reasoning, through perception and imagination, as for Plotinus. It is through perception and picture thinking in imagination, that mind becomes self-conscious, though perception itself is not the
self-consciousness of mind. Mind cannot attain self-consciousness in perception because perception entails the separation of being and reason, essence
and substance. The content of being, the real in nature, becomes multiple and
differentiated in perception, as opposed to the apperception of Plotinus; it is
subject to time in sequence, and space in measurement and proportion, as
with Kant. The essence of being, being-in-self, cannot be known by the level
of consciousness as given by perception, but through perception selfconsciousness of mind can be attained.
The Vorstellung or picture thinking in the imagination is the middle term
between the absolute and existence, the universal and particular, the intellectual and discursive reason, unconscious and conscious thought. The selfconsciousness of mind or spirit is its descent into existence. Picture thinking,
as the middle term, is the synthetic connection of spirit and existence, the
doubling of the self-consciousness of spirit, the “consciousness of passing
into otherness” (§767), the self-alienation of discursive reason. Picture thinking is a manifestation of mind, as is the self-consciousness of the thinking
subject. The “dissociation in picture-thinking” of mind or the intellectual,
unconscious thought, “consists in its existing in a specific or determinate
mode,” a particular in the universal diffusion of mind in existence. In the objectivity of picture thinking, mind steps forward out of itself toward the absolute, where it is able to “become an actual Self, to reflect itself into itself”
(§766) in self-consciousness.
In pure thought or intuition, the intellectual, the absolute is “immediately
simple and self-identical, eternal essence” (§769). As an inner essence, the
absolute cannot be signification or existent, but pure being-in-self. It is not
the substance of picture thinking or of discursive reason, but the negative of
conscious thought, “the negativity of thought, or negativity as it is in itself in
essence; i.e. simple essence is absolute difference from itself, or its pure othering of itself.” The intellectual is the othering of discursive reason. In the
Mystical Theology of Pseudo-Dionysius, “the pre-eminent cause of every ob-
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ject of sensible perception is none of the objects of sensible perception”
(136), 15 and the absolute is “eminently unknown yet exceedingly luminous,
where the pure, absolute and unchanging mysteries of theology are veiled in
the dazzling obscurity of the secret silence, outshining all brilliance with the
intensity of their darkness,” 16 in the intellectual, as it were. The otherness of
the absolute is the objective, as given by picture thinking in its differentiation
in the reproductive imagination.
For Hegel in the Phenomenology of Spirit, the absolute unfolds toward
existence in three stages: essence, being-for-self as the other of essence, and
being-for-self as self-consciousness in the other (§770). Being-for-self as the
other of essence is an externalization, and the self-consciousness of essence
itself. Being-for-self as the other of essence is the logos, signification in language, which “when uttered, leaves behind, externalized and emptied, him
who uttered it, but which is as immediately heard, and only this hearing of its
own self is the existence of the Word,” as in the logos endiathetos of Plotinus. The externalization of essence as other is the radical otherness from essence or origin which constitutes thought in language, the radical otherness
of perception from intellection.
The externalization of essence as other, and the self-consciousness of essence as other, in language, is the Vorstellung in imagination, given by reason in signification (through the logos). Essence itself is an other of the
absolute, an abstraction in signification and a negation of the universal
(§772). Essence is the other of the self-contained and undivided of the absolute in existence, thus the originary self-consciousness. The difference between absolute and essence is resolved in pure intuition, and in pure being,
and is not differentiated as in discursive reason or existence. The otherness of
the absolute is contained within itself in pure thought and being, though the
absolute contains the seed of differentiation and otherness. The absolute,
“eternal or abstract spirit” (§774), self-sufficient being, passes into the otherness of existence, when elements of pure being “spontaneously part asunder
and also place themselves over against each other” (§773), in differentiation.
The creation of the world of otherness is picture thinking, the selfconsciousness of mind that manifests itself in the imagination and perception. Essence is then posited as existence and universals are posited as particulars in discursive reason and perception, in the “dissolution of their
simple universality and the parting asunder of them into their own particularity” (§774). Mind, the intellectual, retains its presence in all particularity and
is recognized in the particular when the individual self “has consciousness
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and distinguishes itself as ‘other’, or as world, from itself,” in discursive reason. The individual self must become an other to itself in conscious thought
before it can recognize itself as mind or spirit, as the absolute must become
other to itself to enter into existence. The self-consciousness of mind, and the
individual self, as other, entails a withdrawal into itself, through selfconsciousness. The individual self in self-consciousness must become selfalienated, must see its existence as alien to being, in order to become conscious of its participation in spirit, the intellectual.
The relations between perception and language and thought and nature,
the ideal and real, are further explored by Hegel in the Philosophy of Mind
(Philosophie des Geistes), Part Three of the Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences (Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im
Grundrisse, 1830). Mind (Geist) is a product of nature, but nature vanishes in
the self-consciousness of mind, in the being-for-self of the idea or intelligible
in mind. In self-consciousness the subject and object of the idea are the same,
and the necessity of nature in the principle of sufficient reason is no longer
adequate or appropriate for the phenomenon of mind, as it sees itself in selfconsciousness. The identity of subject and object in the idea or intelligible,
which does not occur in nature, is “absolute negativity” (Philosophy of Mind
§381) 17 because it does not consist of the externalization of essence which is
necessary in nature as a function of material reproduction and the laws of necessity in reason. The identity of subject and object is only possible outside
of nature, and only possible in mind. In nature, idea is in a state of “asunderness” where subject and object are not unified in it; it is external to both itself
and mind, and the essential nature of mind, in its self-conscious otherness
which is not possible in nature, because of the lack of the revelation of the
absolute in nature, because of the material necessity of the particular.
The “triumph over externality” of mind is the “ideality of mind,” the selfconsciousness of mind in its opposition to causal necessity and to itself. The
ideality of mind is itself a necessary product of the relation between mind
and what is external to it, and the self-consciousness of mind in its relation to
its externality, in its translation of its externality to its inner function, as philosophy entails primarily the translation of the particular to the universal.
Mind defines itself in its translation of that which is external to it, and is thus
set against nature. Language is a function in mind of the translation from the
external or objective to the subjective, and from the particular to the universal. The very nature of the sign in language is that the particular becomes
subject to the universal in the transition of the perceived object into the word,
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and the simultaneous transition of the word into the idea. The formulation of
language is a process of the externalization of perception, of Vorstellung, into the particulars which mask the unified universality of existence and render
existence fragmented and self-alienated.
The word in language abstracts the universal from the particular; meaning is a product of the self-differentiation of the particular in language, the
primordial dehiscence of the universal in nature. Any word in language given
to designate a particular is automatically taken as a universal in abstract
thought. The universal is only given by the external manifestation of the particular in the word, and is thus necessarily a negation, a double negation, of
consciousness in language in relation to externality. Self-conscious mind for
Hegel “sets itself over against itself, makes itself its own object and returns
from this difference, which is, of course, only abstract, not yet concrete, into
unity with itself.” Mind is thus necessarily given to itself in ideality, as a
function of language. In its ideality, mind abstracts particulars into universals; it transforms the reality with which it is confronted, leaving it “poisoned
and transfigured,” transformed into a spiritual existence of the abstracted
universal. The universality in abstract mind in fact prevents the material reality with which it is confronted to exist as independent of that universality and
abstraction; mind is condemned to its own mechanisms in self-consciousness
and self-differentiation. There is no possibility of mind overcoming itself, of
knowing anything beyond itself, beyond its own premise of operations. In
that mind sees itself as differentiated from nature, there is no possibility that
mind can know nature beyond the premise of its self-differentiated relation to
it, just as in the pre-scientific era mind could only know nature in so far as it
could project itself into it.
In the biological necessity of self-differentiation, the Trieb, mind can
never be satisfied with its own limited activity in the abstraction of the particular to the universal, material reality in perception to the idea, in language
and thought. The product of this restlessness and dissatisfaction in philosophy is the desire for an absolute, the universal which is hidden by the externality of language in thought. Mind seeks the essence of the material in
perception which is lost in language; philosophy is thus a seeking beyond
language, an attempt to rescue the essence and universal which has been lost
by the activity of thought in its self-consciousness. The idea is the perceived
resurrection of the essence of being in reason, or finite thought, the reentrance of the absolute into the self-differentiated and sundered structure of
rational thought, as the intellectual is to discursive reason in the thought of
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Plotinus. In discursive reason, ideality in self-consciousness develops toward
the absolute in the dialectic, and is thus dependent on the self-differentiation
and negation given by reason in perception.
In perception, mind orders the world according to its own mechanisms,
its reason, and forms in perception, like forms in language, correspond to the
self-affirmation of mind in the negation of the other. Beauty in nature and
art, as the self-affirmation of mind, is also the negation or destruction of the
other, what is other to reason. Through language and perception, form and
content become identical in mind. Content is only differentiated from form,
as intelligible, in the intellectual, in the dialectical transcendence of reason in
the return of mind to itself from being-for-self in self-consciousness. Content
(being-within-itself) is only given to mind as separate from form in the manifestation of mind only to itself, in self-consciousness in the return from the
other. Metaphysical philosophy seeks to discover content as separate from
form; whether such an independent existence is possible is irrelevant to the
necessity of mind to discover itself in its own negation.
In the Philosophy of Mind, Hegel described unconscious thought or the
intellectual, as an intelligence which is a “night-like mine or pit in which is
stored a world of infinitely many images and representations, yet without being in consciousness” (§453), inaccessible to conscious thought. He wrote
that “…I do not as yet have full command over the images slumbering in the
mine or pit of my inwardness, am not as yet able to recall them at will”
(§453, Zusatz). Hegel placed the unconscious in nature or the real, as a
“germ” from which all qualities come into existence, as in the development
of a tree. Intelligence itself is a “subconscious mine,” an undifferentiated
universal prior to its realization as particulars and separations or differentiations, like classical archetypal intelligence, the intellectual of Plotinus. The
origin of the universal as a mental representation must be found in this unconscious realm, the real of nature, inaccessible to conscious thought. The
origin of the universal in thought is in the material reality of nature, as in the
material substrate of Aristotle.
It is through the intuition, following Kant, that the images of the intellectual are presented to discursive reason and perception as objective representations of universals transformed into particulars. The a priori intuition is
thus a mechanism of the intellectual or unconscious thought, the content of
which is presented to conscious thought in the form of images, as in the imagination of Plotinus. The objective images presented to conscious thought in
the Vorstellung, picture thinking or representation, are not the content of un-
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conscious thought themselves, according to Hegel, but rather a “plastic shape
of an existent intuition of similar content” (§454, Zusatz), that is, a representation or a copy. The universal unconscious of nature can only be conceived
through representations of it as archetypal forms of intuition that can then
only be known or cogitated through representations in the particulars of conscious thought. The consciousness of a present plastic, objective form of an
intuition then makes us aware that there is an unconscious, noetic memory of
previous intuitions, as in the schemata of Kant.
The representation or Vorstellung is a “‘synthesis’ of the internal image
with the recollected existence,” the mnemic residue of the sensible form. The
internal image (Bild) would be the intelligible image, thus the presentation
would be the synthesis of the sensible and intelligible images, formed
through language, as in Plotinus. In Enneads V.3.3, impressions are received
by discursive reason from sense perception, but discursive reason can only
respond to them with the help of memory. With the help of memory, discursive reason then performs analytical operations on the impressions from
sense perception, “taking to pieces what the image-making power gave
it….” 18 As the perception of a sensible object entails both the eidos of the
object and the eidos of the intelligible idea of the object in the intellectual,
“actual seeing is double” (Enneads V.5.7). The power (virtus of Grosseteste)
to form the image in the mind’s eye is conversely always accompanied by
the “verbal expression” (IV.3.30), or more accurately, the logos endiathetos,
the word in thought, as Plotinus intended it. The intelligible image, and thus
the sensible image, is not possible without the linguistic expression of it, and
linguistic expression is not possible without the intelligible image. Perception of sensible objects is only possible after the idea of the sensible object is
articulated in language in intellection. While the “intellectual act is without
parts,” as it has not been differentiated in discursive reason, and thus in perception, it “has not, so to speak, come out into the open, but remains unobserved within,” as Plotinus described it.
As a result of the synthesis of the sensible and intelligible image (form),
according to Hegel, “by this synthesis the internal now has the qualification
of being able to be presented before intelligence and to have its existence in
it” (Philosophy of Mind §453, Zusatz), as for Plotinus, in discursive reason,
through imagination, language and memory. In the presentation in discursive
reason, the intelligible forms of the intellectual, universals or archetypes, are
manifest as “singularized and mutually independent powers or faculties”
(§451, Zusatz), for Hegel. The form that is produced in the imagination and
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made available to conscious thought is a Vorstellungsrepräsentanz, a representation of a representation, as for Freud. Our identity in conscious thought
or discursive reason, or our self-consciousness, can only be given as a representation doubled over, far removed from the origin of discursive thought in
the intellectual. Self-consciousness is an illusion; it can only be of a representation in the differentiated particulars of sense perception and imagination, the shadows on the wall in the Allegory of the Cave of Plato, as it were,
as in the subject of Plotinus caught in a play of mirror reflections.
Discursive reason, according to Hegel, is dependent upon images in the
reproductive imagination, following Kant. The reproductive imagination is
an imitation of the productive imagination, connected to the empirical laws
of sense perception and the differentiation of particulars. The differentiation
of particulars is derived from the universals of space and time, the a priori
intuitions in the categories of Kant. Space and time are then not pure concepts for Hegel, but rather qualities of the universal unconscious of nature,
the real. The manner in which the universal intuitions become differentiated
particulars in discursive reason defines the individuality of the thinking subject. The formation of the image in the reproductive imagination, as it is tied
to the particulars of sense perception, is unique in each individual, while the
intuition from which the image is formed is a universal in nature. According
to Hegel in the Philosophy of Mind, through recollection, which is the “first
form of mental representation” (§455, Zusatz), intelligence, or the intellectual, “emerging from its abstract inward being into determinateness,” thus
“disperses the night-like darkness enveloping the wealth of its images,” in
the inaccessibility of unconscious thought, “and banishes it by the luminous
clarity of a present image” in conscious thought as given by imagination.
There are three stages by which intuition is unfolded as an image or form
in imagination for Hegel. The first is the stage most tied to empirical experience, being the reproductive imagination, by which the image enters into existence. Through connecting and associating the existent image with other
existent images, the images are raised to “general ideas or representations.”
The general ideas or representations are then related to the existent image as
a particular, in the third stage, and the representation itself assumes a “pictorial existence.” The third stage is the “creative imagination (Phantasie),” or
productive imagination. The creative imagination produces symbols and
signs, mechanisms of the connection between the particular image and the
universal idea, sensible form and intelligible form. The sign connects the
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present existent image to the unconscious memory of images, and thus to the
transition to the universal idea.
In the thought of Kant, the reproductive imagination is a passive imagination, creating derived representations and reproducing empirical perceptions in connection with memory within the framework of intuition. The
productive imagination is an active imagination, able to produce a representation of an object preceding empirical experience, in intuition. The power to
reproduce the form of an a priori intuition in the lower imagination is the
Bildungskraft. The productive imagination, Einbildung, operates without any
connection to empirical phenomena, or sensible or intelligible form. There
are six levels of image formation in the Kantian scheme, which are summarized in the Hegelian scheme. The reproductive imagination is composed of
Abbildung, Nachbildung, and Vorbildung: direct image formation in the present moment, reproduction of images that have already been formulated, and
reproduction of images from the past and present in anticipation of future
images. The activities of the reproductive imagination are connected to discursive reason and sense perception. While they are governed by the categories of a priori intuition, the activities of the reproductive imagination
generate images according to empirical laws of association connected to
sense perception.
The productive imagination is composed of Einbildung, Ausbildung, and
Gegenbildung, and is not connected to sense perception or empirical experience, thus being a product of the intellectual. Einbildung is the power to invent images not connected to sense perceptions, and comes into discursive
reason through the formation of the invented image. Ausbildung completes
the invented image in the intellectual, and the invented image is finally
formed in Gegenbildung as a symbol or a sign, as a representational mechanism, as in Hegel’s scheme, connecting the image with the a priori intuition.
Gegenbildung completes the process of the intuition or intelligible becoming
an existent form in a representation in discursive thought as image, through
the analogue, symbol or sign, as in the logos endiathetos in the imagination
in the scheme of Plotinus. The symbolum provides the illusion of the selfconsciousness of discursive reason, and also the consciousness of the necessity of the intellectual.
Through the imagination, according to Hegel, the individual is subsumed
under the universal, the unconscious of nature, as in the conceptual categories of Kant. The intelligence or intellectual is a “concrete subjectivity”
(§456), derived from a “latent content” or “Ideal principle.” Latent content is
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the term used by Freud to describe unconscious dream thoughts before they
are transformed into dream images, the manifest content. The Ideal principle
recalls the terminology of Plotinus, the intelligible in nous poietikos or the
intellectual. Such intelligence can only be known by anticipation, as it is represented in the imagination. The creative imagination is that aspect of intelligence or unconscious thought that is able to associate created images,
mnemic images, or images in memory, and existent images, through representation, combining subjective and objective experience, or the ideal and
the real, to create conscious thought in discursive reason, and selfconsciousness. The creative imagination is seen as “symbolic, allegorical, or
poetical imagination,” operating through the symbolum, or logos endiathetos
as it were. The allegorical or poetical is figural and tropic, as in the tropic
mechanisms in language of condensation and displacement through which
the latent content of dreams is transformed into the manifest content, according to Freud, described by Lacan as metaphor and metonymy. The imagination, which gives us our reality, is not a literal representation, but rather
poetic. Reality is constructed by language, and the synthesizing function of
the creative imagination. Individual, particular objects of sense perception
and reproductive imagination are synthesized into a poetic, tropic totality, as
in the manifold of Kant, or the apperception of Plotinus, that necessitates its
source in the intellectual or unconscious thought. Kant and Hegel mined the
themes of classical philosophy in order to construct schemes to understand
the functions of language and perception in intellection and reason, and in so
doing paved the way for the psychoanalysis of Freud and Lacan.
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